UNDERSTANDING THE ROOT CAUSES OF
MILITARY COUPS AND GOVERNMENTAL
INSTABILITY IN WEST AFRICA

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West Africa with its 16 countries is the cradle of military coups and governmental instability totaling 44 coups in 50 years of independence. Major studies identify and explain the causes in different structural theories: Political development - Military centrality - Ethnic antagonism - World system/dependency theory. While agreeing with all these theories as leading factors of governmental instability and military coups in West Africa, this study widens the scope to a more prominent factor that contributed to this situation. This research posits that the premature and sudden departure of colonial military powers is the major cause of the governmental instability and military coups in West Africa. This sudden departure creates a gape in the security and most importantly in the professionalization of the embryonic West African militaries with regards to the civil-military relations. A qualitative case study with a controlled comparison between Niger and Senegal showed a difference in the outcomes with regards to stability and military coups. A permanent presence of military installation of a democratic power like the case with French troops in Senegal would help provide the same governmental stability in the other West African countries.

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any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
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ABSTRACT

UNDERSTANDING THE ROOT CAUSES OF MILITARY COUPS AND
GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN WEST AFRICA, by LTC Kokou Oyome
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West Africa with its 16 countries is the cradle of military coups and governmental
instability totaling 44 coups in 50 years of independence. Major studies identify and
explain the causes in different structural theories: Political development - Military
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other West African countries.

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INTRODUCTION

Background

In postcolonial era many new independent countries use military coups as an institutional method for changing government. Global-level studies constantly identify Africa as the region most prone to military coups (Finer 1988; Janowitz 1977; Thompson 1973). Bertsch, Clark, and Wood (1978, 431), found that "a coup or attempted coup occurred once every four months in Latin America (between 1945and 1972), once every seven months in Asia (1947-1972), once every three months in the Middle East (1949-1972), and once every 55days in Africa (1960-1972)." Our understanding of a military coup is the irregular seizure of the state's central executive by the regular armed forces or by the internal security forces through the use (or the threat of the use) of force. With focus on West African countries, this study intends to shed light on the causes and elements of the recurring military coups with the subsequent instability.

Most global studies find Africa as the most coups prone region. More narrowed research identifies the West African sub-region as the most inclined to military coups. From their independence in the 1960s through 2004, West African countries register 40 successful military coups and 80 failed coups attempts (McGowan 1986). West Africa is one of the world's most unstable regions. According to the World Bank, in the past 15 years, West African nations account for more than 70 percent of the military coups in Africa.

What are the causes of military coups and governmental instability in West Africa?

Was the departure of the colonial military from West Africa too early?

Do civil-military relations play a role in the recurrent military coups in West Africa?

Assumptions

The researcher assumes that the trend of military coups and instability in West Africa is far from declining. The following table established by Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (2004) depicts the number of military coups in West Africa along with the number of years of military rule since the post-colonial era.

Table 1.   Successful Coups in West Africa, 1963-1999

Country	Number of coups	Coup year	Number of years of Military Rule
Benin	6	1963, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1990	17
Burkina Faso	5	1966, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987	31
Cape-Verde	(-)	(-)	(-)
Cote d'Ivoire	1	1999	1
Gambia	1	1994	2
Ghana	5	1966, 1972, 1978, 1979, 1981	20
Guinea	2	1984, 2008	11
Guinea -Bissau	4	1980, 1999, 2003, 2012	20
Liberia	2	1980, 1990	6
Mali	3	1968, 1991, 2002	25
Mauritania	6	1978, 1979, 1980, 1984, 2005, 2008	17
Niger	4	1974, 1996, 1998, 2010	20
Nigeria	6	1966, 1966, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1993	32
Senegal	(-)	(-)	(-)
Sierra Leone	5	1967, 1967, 1968, 1992, 1997	6
Togo	2	1963, 1967	25

Source: Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall, "Coup d'etat events, 1946-2012," Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, http://www.systemicpeace. org/inscr/inscr.htm (accessed 12 September 2013).

Since the publication of this table by Adebajo and Rashid and the conclusion of McGowan's study from 2006 to 2010, four additional successful coups occur in the region; two in Guinea Bissau, one in Niger and one in Mali. With some slight changes, many West African countries continue with military rule until the recent past. These 16 countries account for 44 military coups in 50 years, meaning an average of 1.13 coups every year and 2.75 coups per country. This last fact shows no evidence that coup activities are declining in West Africa, thus raising stability and socioeconomic concerns in the region. Although many scholars have already conducted research and studies on

the issue, the author still sees military coups and violent regime change as a recurring problem that needs addressed for the sake of stability and the socioeconomic development of the whole region. This situation raises a key question that the present research will try to answer by analyzing some key factors leading to military coups and instability in West Africa.

Definitions of Key Terms

Africanization: the replacement of the professionally trained colonial officers with indigenous officers who are more likely to have strong ethnic loyalties (Jenkins and Kposowa 1993).

Civil-Military Relations: describes the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority.

Colonialism: normally refers to a period of history from the late 15th to the 20th century when European nation states established colonies on other continents. In other words, it is the establishment, maintenance, acquisition, and expansion of colonies in one territory by people from another territory.

Democratic State: a state in which the people have the right to determine who governs them and hold the principal governing officials accountable for their actions; it is also a state where legal limits are imposed on government's authorities by guaranteeing certain rights and freedom to their citizens (Sodaro 2007, 171).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): a regional organization for economic integration in West Africa.

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Military Coup Détat (dependent variable): the "irregular seizure of the state's central executive by the regular armed forces or by the internal security forces through the use (or the threat of the use) of force" (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993, 127). Merriam Webster defines it as "the sudden, extrajudicial deposition of a government, usually by a small group of the existing state establishment, typically the military, to replace the deposed government with another body, either civil or military. A coup d'état succeeds if the usurpers establish their dominance when the incumbent government fail s to prevent or successfully resist their consideration of power" (Merriam Webster 2013).

Permanent Foreign Military Establishment (independent variable): the continuous visible presence of a military installation belonging to a democratic major power in a weak country.

Post-Colonialism: an intellectual direction (sometimes also called an "era" or the "post-colonial theory") that exists since around the middle of the 20th century. It developed from and mainly refers to the time after colonialism. The ultimate goal of post-colonialism is accounting for and combating the residual effects of colonialism on cultures.

Small Power: a country with limited political, military, or economic capabilities and influence (Kegley and Blanton 2013, 118). This study categorizes all West African countries as small powers or small countries.

<center>Limitations</center>

This study suffers some limitations in terms of primary sources to adequately address the issue. This research is limited to one comparative case study which the author believes will provide the necessary understanding of the problem of military coups and

instability in West Africa, but may not provide a comprehensive and overarching solution to the concerns. It will not involve interviewing political or military leaders of the region or elsewhere. Furthermore, the author did not find any work, diary, report, or any other reference from a firsthand actor of a military coup in West Africa. None of the perpetrators have ever written anything that analytically depicts the real root causes underlying their act.

Scope and Delimitations

This research is solely limited to the West African region with its 16 countries. The results and findings may not be applicable to other parts of the African continent or elsewhere. The selected case study is limited to two West African former French colonies that best fit the point this research is intending to make.

Significance of the Study

Most of the governments in West Africa operate with a visceral fear of a potential military coup at any time. This fear is justified by the military coups within the last five years in West Africa: Mauritania (August 2008), Guinea (December 2008), Guinea-Bissau (December 2008 and April 2012), Niger (February 2010) and Mali (March 2012). This research will provide the West African policy makers with additional understanding of the causes of military coups and instability in the region.

The result of this study will also constitute a basis for other scholarships of the military science and art to build upon for a better understanding of the root causes of military coups and instability with the subsequent socioeconomic problem in West Africa. It will ultimately help young West African military leaders to redefine their role

and place in a democratic society along with the rule of law and the control of civilian over military.

Overview of West Africa

West Africa consists of 16 countries that cover a total area of about 6.5 million square kilometers; roughly the same area as the contiguous United States (U.S.) minus Texas. The total population of the sub-region is around 250 million people, giving an average density of just 38 people per square kilometer; a little higher than the U.S., but way below European or Asian average. Of the total population of West Africa, the Federal Republic of Nigeria makes up nearly half with a population of 120 million. Most West Africans make their living from subsistence farming. The region has few exports. Oil is the principle revenue-earner for Nigeria, cocoa mainly in Cote d'Ivoire, and gold is the major exporting commodity of Ghana. Several countries have phosphate resources, Togo being the world's fourth largest producer. Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin rely on the cotton crop, and Niger has uranium. Diamonds are one of the sensitive natural resources of West Africa. Liberia and Sierra Leone are the primary producers of diamonds.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created on 28 May 1975 promotes the economic integration of the West African region and helps the member states overcome the socioeconomic hardship they experience. The governmental instability and military coups issues are not part of its concerns. Most of the West African leaders come to power through military coup and can therefore not condemn military coups. The outburst of the democratic wind in the 1990s triggers some amendment of the ECOWAS charter thus officially banning military coups in West Africa. In spite of some challenges, the institution is striving to instill the democratic culture with constitutional

ways of accessing the power in the West African region. Its headquarters is located in

Abuja, Nigeria.

Table 2.   Countries of West Africa

COUNTRY	CAPITAL CITY	DATE OF INDEPENDENCE	POPULATION	SURFACE	COLONIAL MASTER	OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
Benin	Porto-Novo	1 August 1960	11 Million	42,000sq Mi	France	French
Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	5 September 1960	17million	105,900sqMi	France	French
Cape Verde	Praia	5 July 1975	800,000	1500sq Mi.	Portugal	Portuguese
Cote D Ivoire	Abidjan	5 August 1960	21 Million	124,503sqMi.	France	French
Gambia	Banjul	18 February 1965	2 Million	3,980sq Mi.	Great Britain	English
Ghana	Accra	6 March 1957	25 million	92,100sq Mi.	Great Britain	English
Guinea	Conakry	2 October1958	10 million	94,980sq Mi.	France	French
Guinea Bissau	Bissau	10 October 1974	1.7 Million	13,948sq Mi.	Portugal	Portuguese
Liberia	Monrovia	26 July 1847	3.5 million	43,000sq Mi.	None	English
Mali	Bamako	22 September 1960	15 million	478,839sq Mi	France	French
Mauritania	Nouatchott	28 November 1960	3.5 million	397,954sq Mi.	France	French
Niger	Niamey	3 August 1960	16 million	489,698sq Mi.	France	French
Nigeria	Lagos	1 October 1960	200 million	356,667sq Mi.	Great Britain	English
Senegal	Dakar	4 April 1960	14 million	76,000sq Mi.	France	French
Sierra Leone	Freetown	27 April 1961	6.5 million	27,699sq Mi.	Great Britain	English
Togo	Lome	27 April 1960	6.6 million	22,000sq Mi.	France	French

Source: Created by author using data from Central Intelligence Agency, "World Factbook," https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed 12 September 2013).

With the exception of Mauritania, whose government withdraws from the

organization in 2000, all of the countries mentioned above are members of the

ECOWAS.

Figure 1.   Map of West Africa

Source: Maps of World, "Map of West Africa," Compare Infobase Ltd., www.mapsofworld.com (accessed 14 June 2013).

Organization of the Study

Military coups and governmental instability were and continue to be a big threat

to the harmonious socioeconomic development of West African countries. The recent

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coups events in the region (Niger, Guinea Bissau and Mali) show the necessity to address the issue and highlight some of the major causes for a deeper understanding.

Five chapters comprise this study. Chapter 1 is the introduction and background to the study. It lays the foundations for the issue, stating the reasons that justify the current study and the research question and secondary questions that result from it. It also underlines the significance of the study, and tackles limitations and the overall scope through a brief overview of the West African region. Chapter 2 is a literature review of the subject looking at scholarly works on military coups along with previously developed theories. Chapter 3 deals with the methodology of the research, which is a qualitative analysis using a case study based on a controlled comparison. The countries studied are Niger and Senegal. Chapter 4 analyzes the research information obtained from the study of the two countries. It also reviews what Senegal does to avoid the problems or issues with military coups and instability common to other countries in West Africa. Chapter 5 presents the summary of findings, conclusions, and makes recommendations for further research in the area.

<u>Conclusion and Summary</u>

The research seeks to establish the factors that lead to military coups and governmental instability in West Africa. It aims at doing this in order to provide an insightful understanding of the problem. The main question it seeks to answer is: what factors led to the widespread trend of military coups and instability in West Africa?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

West Africa is the most tumultuous region in the world with its repetitive military coups and violent regime changes. This state of affairs impedes the stability and constitutes a great handicap to a sustainable and viable economic development of the sub region. Moreover, this subsequent instability affects the whole African continent with repercussions on the global north. In *The Coming Anarchy*, Robert D. Kaplan describes West Africa as "the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which anarchy emerges as real strategic danger" (Kaplan 1994). The most effective way to get out of this sorrowful cliché is for West Africa to break this trend of military coups.

This state of affairs raises a certain number of questions: what makes West Africa such a coup prone region and what sociopolitical factors nurture this mentality?; is there any clearly identifiable pattern of events that could help predict when military coups are most likely to occur?; and ultimately are there adequate and effective measures that governments could take to mitigate this risk and eradicate this scourge from the region? The same concern is highlighted in the diagram below published in September 2012 by Habiba Ben Barka and Mthuli Ncube of the African Development Bank in their article "Are military coups d'état a never-ending phenomenon?" (Ben Barka and Ncube 2012, 6). West Africa clearly leads in terms of military coups according the results of their research thus inciting more study on the issue. The diagram shows that West Africa has the biggest share of military coups in Africa in the three different periods (1960-1969, 1970-1989, and 1990-2012). The current research paper is also intended to take a step

further in addressing other factors that might help understand the recurrent problem of coups and instability in that particular part of Africa.

Figure 2.   Sub-regional Share of Military Coups: 1960-1969, 1970-1989, 1990-2012

Source: Habiba Ben Barka and Mthuli Ncube, "Are military coups d'etat a never-ending phenomenon?" (Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank, September 2012), 6.

The present research will delve into the stated problem and attempt to understand its plausible roots in order to help mitigate the scourge of military coups and instability in West Africa. This will surely allow the 16 West African countries with their 250 million citizens to enjoy a more prosperous life in a safer environment. Senegal and Cape Verde are the only countries in West Africa that never to have any military coups and enjoy governmental stability since their independence (Adebajo and Rashid, 2004). This fact

rightly answers the secondary question of this study which will identify the factors that underlie this state of affairs in those two countries.

Building upon previous analytical works on military coups in Africa, this paper will first focus on exploring coups in West Africa and their underlying causes in order to provide the necessary understanding of the issue. This chapter intends to review existing insightful literature on the issue. The striking observation is the fact that researchers identify numbers of various factors resulting in military coups.

Many scholars analyze the causes and outcomes of military coups d'état here and there in Africa. In the theoretical framework, Jackman in his early work (1978) attributes the coups d'état that took place in the new West African countries from 1960 to 1975 to three broad reasons: social mobilization or "modernization," cultural pluralism, and political factors (i.e., political party system and mass participation). Jackman argues that social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group are the cause of destabilization for the new established governments in sub-Saharan Africa. According to him, a multiplicity of political parties can be destabilizing, whereas single–party dominance has a stabilizing effect on post-independence governments. However, when faced with electoral turnout (political mobilization), Jackman realizes that both multipartyism and the dominant ethnic groups have destabilizing effects. This is to some extent true because most West African countries associate political parties with ethnic groupings. These various bogus political parties establish their partisan ramifications deep into the military thus creating a vicious circle rivalry resulting coups and counter coups.

From Jackman's earlier analysis, Johnson, Slater and McGowan (1984) discover that " States with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which maintain or restore some degree of political participation and political pluralism experience fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics." They clearly come up with the conclusion that some measures of positive economic performance are highly stabilizing, such as a high level of productive employment, robust economic growth, sound export performance and diversified commodity exports.

This conclusion, however consistent, leaves room for argument especially when we look at some West African countries that have suffered military coups or plots of military coups in spite of their high momentum in economic growth. Adekeye Adebayo (2002), in his work on military coups in West Africa argues that military coups ruin the socioeconomic and political development in the West African states. During the 1980s, in spite of their remarkable economic prosperity, Nigeria and Togo respectively suffered from military coups and many failed attempts at coups. The series of military coups in Nigeria is a factor that jeopardizes the country's economic growth in the 1980s (Peters 1997, 200). This shows that economic shortfall cannot be the only factor leading to military coups which in turn are causes of this situation.

Another factor is the nature of the civil military relations in most West African countries. Conventional scholarship on African militaries tends to focus almost exclusively on the causes of military coups, civil-military relations (or lack thereof), and the developmental roles of the military and its disassociation with politics. Typical of this approach are studies by Samuel Huntington, Amos Perl Mutter, and Samuel Finer, which

earlier praise the virtues of militaries in politics. However, a variety of narratives, for example (Kandeh 2004), attributes military coups to the low levels of professionalism and political institutionalization. He argues that military coups in West Africa are due to the lack of education of the military with allusion to the subalterns. Facts however show that high ranking officers with noticeable high education level, organize and execute most of the military coups in West Africa. The low ranking military personnel conduct very few military coups in West Africa. Liberia is the only registered case of such a coup where Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe successfully takes power through a military coup on 12 April 1980 (Adebajo 2002).

More often than not, following colonialism in West Africa, the military officers' corps receives most of its advanced education and training from its eventual allied partners, thus the concept of professional militaries is established. What is lacking however, is education and training in the realm of civil-military relations, where military officers train to understand the notion of civil control of the military. Clearly, this fundamental aspect of a professional military in a free, democratic society is lacking.

Morris Janowitz (1964 and 1977) addresses the same perspective in his works on civil-military relations especially in developing countries. This is the case in most of the West African countries where the civil military relation is rather nonexistent. Repetitive military coups in Guinea Bissau are the result of a lack of sound civil military relations. Even though the country has a civil government, the military dictates and controls every move of the civil rulers who are actually the puppets of the generals in the military. In April 2012, a military coup and many regional and international actors interrupt a

presidential voting process. The ECOWAS deploys intense diplomatic efforts and brokers an agreement with the country's new "military command" (Ramet 2012).

In trying to analyze the internal factors leading to a coup, McBride (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2007) focus their works on the military itself. McBride discovers that personal greed is the basis for the military intervention in politics, motivated by the wealth and privileges enjoyed once they gain power and control over the state. According to Collier and Hoeffler, there is interdependency between the risk of a coup (plotted, attempted or successful) and the level of military spending at the time. They find that in countries with a low coup risk, governments respond by reducing military spending, whereas in countries with a high coup risk governments tend to increase military spending.

Several studies however, show that the larger the budget and number of troops, the greater the likelihood of interventions (Wells 1974; Johnson et al. 1984; Wells and Pollnac 1988; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992). Bienen (1969) and Thomson (1973) side with McBride and Hoeffler and contend that the causality runs the other way with successful coups and threatened interventions creating larger budgets. This position seems more compelling to this research, because the significantly resourceful military conducts most of the military coups in West Africa. The Nigerian military is the most resourceful one in West Africa and has one of the highest scores in military coups and governmental instability in the region; six military coups in total (Adebajo and Rashid, 2002).

Building on the study conducted by Augustine Kposowa and Craig Jenkins (1993, 123-163), this research will look into some major theories focused on the structural

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sources of military coups in post-colonial Africa. They conduct their work by simultaneously examining the major structural causes of military coups based on past works. In doing so, they find that past works focus on four theories of structural causes. Some of these causes interconnect, thus supporting the concept of mélange leading to military coups in West Africa.

The first theory is the political development theory. The main idea of this theory is that weak social and political institutions create a greater likelihood of military intervention in the form of coups. There is great tension created by mass citizen mobilization facing weak political institutions (Huntington 1968; Barrows 1976; Kasfir 1976; Jackman 1978; Collier 1983). This is the case of Benin, formerly Dahomey, which suffers the trauma of six military coups, five different constitutions and 12 heads of state during its first 10 years of independence (Mwakikagile 2001).

The second theory is the political centrality of the military as rooted in its resources and organizational cohesion (Andreski 1968; Wells 1974; Janowitz 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1988; Wells and Pollnac 1988). The example of the situation in Guinea Bissau illustrates this theory well. The third theory is the plurality, competition, and dominance theory of ethnic antagonism supported by Morrison and Stevenson (1972a, 1972b), McGowan (1975), Jackman (1978), and Jenkins and Kposowa (1990). The military coup conducted in Liberia by Master Sergeant Samuel Doh is the result of ethnic plurality and ethic dominance. In fact, the freed slaves from America settle in Liberia and dominate the indigenous tribes which were already there. These tribes resort to taking low-level jobs and do not have a voice in the state's affairs (Adebajo 2002).The fourth theory is the one of world system/dependency which carries ideas about the

political turmoil created by export specialization and foreign capital penetration. This theory is supported by O'Donnel (1979), O'Kane (1981 and 1983), Thomas (1984), Johnson, Slater, and McGowan (1984), Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), and Neuhouser (1992).

Most of the past works largely looked at the theories separately and neglected intervening political processes, such as political turmoil and ethnic instability, and structural factors like foreign capital penetration. Craig J. Jenkins and Augustine Kposowa partially fill this gap in July 1993 with their work on the structural sources of military coups in postcolonial Africa.

Concerning the political development theory, Kposowa and Jenkins argue that weak social and political institutions create a greater likelihood of military intervention. According to their work, a mélange of factors facilitate military coups in Africa as a whole. First, state building and industrialization created increased social mobilization, and along with it, more mass participation and increased demands on the political system. Second, these "new nations" lack strong political institution, especially mass parties and legislatures that have sufficient strength to channel and regulate this rising participation. (President Obama highlights this aspect in his address during his first visit to Ghana whereby he was urging the West African countries to seek strong institutions instead of strong persons). Multiparty systems are prone to factionalized and deadlocked governments, thereby producing ineffective rule. Third, the resulting participatory overload generates mass political turmoil and thereby provokes military leaders to intervene directly in politics. Frustrated citizens turn to protests and attacks on the state which trigger military interventions, and military leaders become frustrated with what

they perceive as corrupt and ineffective civilian government. Several studies support the mobilization hypothesis but suggest that rising participation is not an intervening factor. While mobilization gives rise to coups, higher turnout in the pre-independence elections deters coups (Jackman 1978). Collier (1983) traces this higher turnout to ethnic dominance, which creates stronger single-party regimes with sufficient legitimacy and cohesion to deter military intervention. McGowan (1975) asserts that mobilization leads to mass turmoil, but that instead of provoking coups this turmoil deters them.

Looking at the military centrality theory, it is clear that its core idea is that resourceful and cohesive militaries are more likely to intervene. Andreski, Janowitz and Finer portray this well in their respective works. In most of the West African states, the military is the most modern institution with professionally trained leaders, access to advanced technology, organizational resources, and a strong esprit de corps among its officers. As such, when faced with the failure of civilian institutions, military leaders are prone to intervene.

This argument is in line with the overload thesis. This theory addresses the internal factors of the military with some scholars arguing that factionalized militaries are more prone to coups. The inter-service rivalries, training school loyalties, and ethnic tensions stemming from colonial staffing policies create conflicts within the military that thereby stir interventions (Smaldone 1974; Marzui 1975; Janowitz 1977; Nordlinger 1977). Although seemingly contradictory, these might be compatible. Janowitz (1964, 40) argues that factionalized militaries are more likely to engage in plots and attempts while a cohesive officer corps is more likely to mount successful seizures.

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Another variable in this military centrality theory is "Africanization" which means replacing professionally trained colonial officers with indigenous officers who are more likely to have strong ethnic loyalties. Smaldone argues that, despite being a symbol of national unity, the Africanization of the postcolonial officer corps actually creates ethnically factionalized militaries with coups prone tendencies. Jenkins and Kposowa find that Africanized militaries are more likely to experience coups but cannot identify the clear relationship of Africanization to military resources or its impact on types of coup events.

A third focus is on the ethnic antagonism in the broader political system with two central questions. First, what patterns of ethnic relations generate coups? Second, does this work through creating mass instability or by elite factionalism? A close study of this theory shows three sub-theories: the ethnic plurality theory, the ethnic dominance theory, and the ethnic competition theory. This position is supported by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), Morrison and Stevenson (1972a, 1972b), and McGowan (1975). For some other scholars, the ethnic antagonism is not relevant once mobilization and military centrality are considered. This point of view is supported by Barrows (1976), Wells (1974), and Wells and Pollnac (1988).

The last focus of Jenkins and Kposowa in their work is on the world system/dependence theory which highlights the "neocolonialism" of export dependence and foreign capital penetration. Most West African countries depend on the export of raw products in an unfair trade agreement with colonial powers. This results in low and stable profits, economic stagnation, poverty, and thereby political turmoil. Paige (1975), Hetchter (1978), and Wallerstein (1979) argue that this state of affairs is often linked to

coercive labor that requires a strong military. Since the educated middle class cannot find any economic opportunity, Thomas (1984), O'Kane (1981 and 1983), and Johnson et al. (1984) conclude that the competition is focused on the state itself thereby encouraging the use of coups and corruption for upward mobility.

Another school of thought on the issue focuses on the theory of colonial heritage of African countries in general. Like most of the other African countries, West African countries have distinct political systems inherited from their respective colonial powers: Britain, France and Portugal. Whereas Luckman (2001) and Coleman and Brice (1962) argue in favor of this theory, both Wells (1974) and Tardoff (1993) contend that evidence does not support this thesis. Soare (2006) highlights that the two West African countries most affected by successful coups (Nigeria and Niger), have in fact very different colonial pasts. Oddly enough, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, two former West African Portuguese colonies have totally different coups dynamics; Cape Verde is coup free whereas Guinea Bissau is a master in this matter. Soare goes to note that Liberia is a colony that has not yet experienced military coups.

<div align="center">Summary and Conclusion</div>

This research seeks more understanding of the causes of military coups and governmental instability in West Africa. This chapter reviews a certain number of theories developed in various literature in regards to the causes of military coups and instability in West Africa. Although all the theories clearly identify major compelling causes, the author finds that these theories fail to address some aspects that may surely help gain an in-depth understanding of the stated problem. Based on the review of the literature, all the theories and causes mentioned should lead to military coups and

governmental instability in Senegal and Cape Verde; which is not the case. The fact that Cape Verde is a relatively young nation pushes the focus of this research more toward Senegal which became independent in the 1960s like most of the West African nations (see table 1).

One of these aspects that the existing literature fails to address is the effect of permanent foreign military establishment in a given country. Studying the effect of foreign military establishment on the likelihood of military coups is crucial particularly in weak states such as those in West Africa. This is why this research will attempt to address the relationship between military coups and foreign military establishment.

The next chapter will discuss in detail this relationship as well as the methodology applied to test the hypothesis. It also addresses the research design and methods, data collection and sources, and data analysis and presentation.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to identify the major elements of governmental instability in West Africa. Its objective is to find the leading factors of the recurrent military coups in West Africa in order to provide a better understanding of the situation in that region. The research will look at this issue in two phases. The first phase will explore the existing factors as discussed in the literature review: ethnical plurality and antagonism, military centrality, insurgency, Africanization of the officer corps. The second phase will focus on whether or not there is the permanent presence of a foreign military and its impact on stability in West African countries. Chapter 1 provides the background of the problem, the primary research question, and the significance of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the issue of military coups and governmental stability in West Africa. This chapter describes the methodology of this research. It will discuss the collation and analysis of information to answer the research question. It will look at research design, data collection and sources, and data analysis and presentation.

Theoretical Framework

The model of controlled comparison proposed by this research sheds light on the relationship between permanent foreign military establishment (independent variable) and the advent of military coups (dependent variable). According to the model, this relationship is rather indirect. For a better understanding of the link between these two variables, it is important to include an intervening variable, namely civil military relations. According to the argument made in this study, the presence of a foreign

military establishment influences the nature of civil military relations in small countries. In such states the local military leadership tends to adopt the same concept of civil military relations demonstrated by the established foreign military in the country.

Additionally, the nature of civil military relations in those small countries will affect the probability of military coups as argued in the review of literature. Subsequently, the permanent foreign military establishment, through its impact on civil military relations, also affects the likelihood of military coups. If the local military leadership of the small states adopts the concept of civil military relations observed by the foreign military establishment, one can expect the likelihood of military coups to be low. Therefore the author hypothesizes that in small countries, the permanent presence of a foreign military establishment prevents military coups and governmental instability.

Permanent foreign military	Positive local security and	Low likelihood of military
Independent variable	Intervening variable	Dependent variable

Figure 3.   Theoretical Framework

Source: Created by author.

Research Design

As noted by Ellen Taylor-Powell and Marcus Renner in a qualitative research, data comes from many people, a few individuals, or a single case (Taylor-Powell and

Renner 2003). This research is a qualitative case study using secondary sources of information on Senegal and Niger. The qualitative study uses the variables identified in chapter 2.

By definition, a qualitative research focuses on examining subjective data, with the intention of gaining insight and knowledge about the subject studied. It is interpretive or responsive and usually inductive; it formulates an idea using observations. It seeks to describe the situation, creating better understanding, which could result in improvements and sees truth as bound by the context (Bethlehem University 2013).

Qualitative research data focuses on observations as opposed to numbers. These observations require analysis and interpretation to make them meaningful and understandable and this calls for creativity, discipline and a systematic approach. There are several ways of going about this. The method chosen is dependent on the questions the researcher wants to answer, the needs of the intended audience and the resources of the researcher (Taylor-Powell and Renner 2003). These also determine the data collection methods and the sources used.

<p style="text-align:center">Measurement of Variables</p>

This study measures the dependent variable, military coup, in accordance with its stated definition from chapter 1. Military coup d'état is defined as "an irregular seizure of the state's central executive by the regular armed forces or the internal security forces through the use (or the threat of the use) of force" (Jenkins and Kposowa 1993, 127). The current study does not consider civilian irregular transfers, cabinet reshufflings, and palace coups. From this definition, the dependent variable will be coded as present if three conditions are met and as absent if otherwise. The first condition is the effective

seizure of power by the perpetrators. The second condition is identification of the perpetrators as members of the regular armed forces or the internal security forces. The third is the use, or the threat, of force.

The measurement of the independent variable of interest to this study, permanent foreign military establishment is as follows. The definition of this variable is the continuous visible presence of a military installation belonging to a democratic major power in a weak country. According to this definition the independent variable will be coded as present if the following conditions are met, and as absent if otherwise. First the establishment must be a military installation with troops and a minimum strength of 1,000 personnel. The second condition is that this installation must belong to a foreign major military power (one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). The third condition is that this major military power must be from a democratic state.

The intervening variable is the variable necessary to connect the independent variable with the dependent variable in case there is no direct apparent causal relation between the two variables (George and Bennett 2005). In this study, the intervening variable is the overall security of civilian authorities and the effective sound civil-military relations with the military rightly placed under civilian control. The independent variable (permanent foreign military installations) in this research, cannot impact the dependent variable (military coups) if this presence does not generate security and instill appropriate civil-military relations. Measurement of this is by the effective provision of security to civilian authorities and by the subordination of the military to civilian leaders.

The control variables and the features of their measurement are in table 3 below.

They are from the study by Jenkins and Kposowa (1992) detailed in chapter 2 of this

study.

Table 3.   Summary of Coup Factors Identified by Jenkins and Kposowa

Variables	Description
Political development and weak institutions	Tension between increasingly mobilized citizenry and weak political institutions in new nations
Ethnic antagonism, plurality and dominance	Plethora of ethnic groups with cultural heterogeneity with a larger and politically hegemonic group in place.
Military centrality	Resourceful and cohesive military with a strong esprit de corps overseeing the whole country.
Colonial heritage	Residues of former colonial power's governmental influence in the country.
Political challenge with insurgency	Political turmoil involving internal armed conflict with secessionist intent.
Economic challenges	The level of the economy of the country and its resources based on the world's standard.

Source: Craig J. Jenkins and Augustine Kposowa, "Explaining Military Coups d'etat:
Black Africa, 1957-1984," *American Sociological Review* 55 (1993): 861-875.

Research Method and Data Collection

The comparative case study method is used to analyze the relevant information

gathered from these secondary sources. The comparative methods involve the non-

statistical comparative analysis of a small number of cases. More specifically, this research utilizes what Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005) coined as "controlled comparison" which is: "the study of two or more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one." In the presence of two such cases, controlled comparison provides the functional equivalent of an experiment that enables the researcher to make use of experimental logic to draw causal inferences (George and Bennett 2005).

The case study concentrates only on the areas necessary to address the stated purpose of the current paper using the variables discussed in chapter 2. The selected case study for this research is the controlled comparison between the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Niger. As mentioned in chapter 2, Niger and Senegal are two West African countries that have most of the similarities that should lead to the same governmental outcomes based on the variables reviewed: ethnical plurality along with the ethnic dominance and ethnic antagonism, military centrality, political challenges with insurgency, colonial heritage after independence, economic assets, and civil military relations. The research focuses on former French colonies because the independence year in West Africa was 1960, and as such, all the former British colonies had at least one military coup and are not used in the present case study.

This study conducts a controlled comparison looking at two periods of the selected countries with the inherent events. The first period ranges from independence in the 1960s to 1974, and the second period from 1974 to 2010. The author chooses these two time periods to serve the purpose of the present research because the first period represents the honeymoon era with governmental stability in both countries, and the

second period is the year of the first military coup in Niger. The specification of these two periods helps highlight the eventual changes that occur over time and which may lead to the military coups in Niger while Senegal remained coup free. This controlled comparison explains the risk of military coup by using the same variables utilized by previous literatures.

According to Taylor-Powell and Renner, there are a number of methods for producing narrative data which requires analysis to fulfill the objectives of a research. These include: open-ended questions and written comments on questionnaires, testimonials, and individual interviews. Others are: discussion group or focus group interviews, logs, journals and diaries and observations. The other methods are: documents, reports and news articles, stories and case studies (Taylor-Powell and Renner 2003). Data for this study comes from research and working papers with key works by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the South African Institute of International Affairs. This research also pulls data from the works of Augustine J. Kposowa and J. Craig Jenkins (1993) on the structural sources of military coups in postcolonial Africa. Chapter 4 analyzes information from these sources and chapter 5 presents the findings.

<u>Reliability and Validity of Data</u>

Taylor-Powell and Renner posit that for a researcher to avoid personal biases influencing the results of his/her analysis, the researcher should use several sources of data, track their choices, and involve others (Taylor-Powell and Renner 2003). This research seeks to satisfy the five step analysis process of: "get to know your data; focus the analysis; categorize the information; identify patterns and connections within and

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between categories; and interpretation, which brings it all together" (Taylor-Powell and Renner 2003).

The use of multiple credible sources using data from previously published studies enhances the reliability of information. Due to the reliance on qualitative research methods for this study, the approach to analysis is descriptive. A comparative analysis of the two West African countries, which are the main focus of the study, Niger and Senegal, is adopted throughout. This enhances the understanding of the causes of military coups and governmental instability and highlights other factors to address in order to mitigate this scourge in West Africa.

Summary and Conclusion

This research uses a qualitative method using secondary sources of information to conduct a case study through controlled comparison. Data is collected using research and working papers from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the South African Institute of International Affairs, and the study by Kposowa and Jenkins. The case study concentrates on only those areas that address the research question through the variables identified in chapter 2. A comparative analysis method interprets the information gathered. The next chapter presents an analysis of information gathered.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This research is an effort to provide a deeper understanding of the causes of

military coups and governmental instability in West Africa. The objective is to identify

the factors that underlie the military coups in West Africa. Chapter 3 describes the

methodology as well as the theoretical framework of the research, stating and discussing

the variables used for analysis. The research is a qualitative analysis using case studies

through a controlled comparison of two West African countries: Niger and Senegal. This

highlights some elements that affect military coups and governmental instability. Chapter

3 also discusses the collation and analysis of information to answer the primary and

secondary questions.

This chapter analyses the two countries looking at how the identified variable or

the lack thereof impact the likelihood of military coups and governmental instability in

West Africa. This analysis first requires the layout of the major characteristics of the two

countries in the controlled comparison.

Case Analysis: Senegal 1960-1974

Background

Senegal is a former French colony located in West Africa on the Atlantic Ocean

with 571 kilometers of coastline and a total surface of 196,722 square kilometers.

Senegal borders the Atlantic Ocean in the West, Gambia in the center, Mauritania to the

North; Mali to the East; Guinea and Guinea Bissau to the South. Its geographic position

makes it one of the fastest sea lines of communication to Europe and the American

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continent. Because of this geographic location, Senegal is one the ports of departure of the slaves from Africa to every destination. "The gate of no return" still exists at the coast of the country. This strategic position also explains the importance of Senegal and justifies its choice as the capital of French West Africa during the colonization era. French involvement in Senegal is so significant that four communes (Saint-Louis, Gore, Dakar and Rufisque) have representatives in the French parliament in Paris even before decolonization. The residents of these four communes receive full French citizenship (Chafer 2013). This explains the presence of Senegalese combatants in the French military during World War II with the so-called "Tirailleurs Senegalais." Senegal gains its independence on 4 April 1960, but maintains very close cultural, economic, political, and military ties with France.

Control Variables

Political Development and Weak Institutions

Just after its independence in 1960, Senegal has six million inhabitants with many diverse ethnic groups. Between 1960 and 1974, Senegal starts to have mass participation from its citizens in the country's political life through development nascent political parties. Institutions of the newly independent country are still at their embryonic stage and have trouble dealing with various challenges resulting from this mass participation. President Senghor`s Democratic Bloc merges with another political party to become the Senegalese Progressive Union (known as the Socialist Party since 1976). When Senegal gains independence in 1960, Senghor is unanimously elected president. He advocates a moderate "African socialism," free of atheism and excessive materialism, but as hinted at

earlier, Senghor`s one-party democracy is soon challenged by students and their trade

union partners.

Figure 4.   Map of Senegal

Source: Fadugu, "Map of Senegal," www.fadugu.com (accessed 6 November 2013).

This challenge begins when Senghor outlaws the most radical parties in Senegal,

such as the African Regrouping Party. These opposition leaders are arrested, but are later

courted and accommodated into the ruling party. Senghor also outlaws the Party of

African Independence. This party is a "Marxist-Leninist," pan-Africanist party that

emphasizes nationalism. Although the PAI dissolves, some of its leaders who were

students in the 1960s remain in today's political opposition. Another illustration of this mass participation is the famous student riot on 27 May 1968 whereby the Association of Senegalese Students and the Dakar Association of Students call an indefinite strike and boycott examinations. The students protest the Progressive Union`s (which became the Socialist Party in 1976) stranglehold of political power—there is no political pluralism and this concerns the students who are politically active since the pre-independence era (Stafford 2009).

Another political challenge is the controversial issue of a coup attempt in 1962 by Prime Minister Mamadou Dia who is campaigning for a revolutionary change of the governmental structures cutting all French interest and presence in the country. His actions push President Senghor to request the dismissal of the government by the Parliament as per constitution. Mamadou Dia orders the gendarmerie to expel the members of the parliament from the room and deny access to that venue until further instructions. This prevents the parliament from voting the dismissal of his government as Senghor wishes. The bill passes at the house of Lamine Gueye, the President of the Parliament. Mamadou Dia is arrested for the coup attempt, and sentenced to life in prison. President Senghor later pardons him in 1976. It is clear that between 1960 and 1974, Senegal experiences political development and struggles with it due to its weak embryonic institutions.

Ethnic Plurality, Dominance and Antagonism

Senegal counts more than 10 different ethnic groups. The dominant ethnic group is the Wolof (44 percent), followed by the Pular (25 percent), and the Serer (15 percent). In terms of religion, Senegal is predominantly a Muslim country with 94 percent of the

population practicing this religion. Five percent are Christians, mostly Roman Catholics, and some indigenous beliefs represent one percent. Using the religious leaders, the colonial power leverages the ethnic antagonism arising from this plethora of ethnic groups. As legacy from the colonial power, the independent Senegal works closely with the same rural Muslim religious leaders who are prepared to play a vital role between the state and the society. "They were strong enough to act as a kind of safety valve" (Coulon 1981).

Colonial Heritage

The biggest heritage left by the colonial power is the French language and the French political system. The country inherits the hybrid governmental structure from France with three different branches: executive, legislative and judiciary. The official language is French, used in the entire administration; the most spoken local language is Wolof which is spoken throughout the entire country. By popular vote, the president wins a seven-year term and is eligible for a second term. Leopold Sedar Senghor is the first president of an independent Senegal. Culturally, Senegal is the incarnation of the French culture and education in West Africa. The most famous French university of West Africa was established in Dakar. It is now Cheick Anta Diop University. It was utilized to spread the French language and culture throughout the region (Chafer 2013, 5).

Economic Challenges

Like many other newly independent West African countries, Senegal is economically challenged. Over the period of 1960 to 1978 the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa grows by less than one percent a year,

according the World Bank figures (Roemer 1982). This is due to the fact that most West African countries at that point in time do not have any reliable structure capable of managing the economic trend of the respective countries. The economy of Senegal also falls into this category. Farming and fishing, which at this point are at their rudimentary stages, are the basis of the economy of the newly independent Senegal.

Military Centrality

The Senegalese military in this era is under the control of civilian authorities. Most of the military units are still under the control of French officers, tasked with educating and upgrading the professional level of the newly established national army. Upon independence, the Senegalese constitution does not grant the military the right to vote or take part in the political life of the country. As such, military centrality is not possible because of the subordination of the military to civilian authorities (Gellar 2005).

Political Challenges with Insurgency

The major political challenge of this period is the recurrent issue of the one-party democracy conducted by President Senghor. Although the residents of the Casamance region show some dissidence to the central government, there is no sign of armed rebellion. These political challenges do not involve any internal armed conflict with secessionist intent.

Independent Variable

The independent variable encompasses three main aspects. The first aspect is the visible presence of foreign military installations with more than 1,000 troops. In this period from 1960 to 1974, France maintains its military installations with about 1,250

troops in Senegal, and is deeply involved in the Senegalese military by training advisers in all domains (Chafer 2013). The other aspects include the qualification as military power from a democratic state. In that regard, France is a military power and a democratic state by all reliable institutions such as: Polity IV project, Freedom House, World Factbook, and many others. As such, the French military presence meets the requirements of this variable. The first president of the newly independent Senegal does not see anything inconvenient in this French military presence.

Intervening Variables

The effective provision of security to civilian leaders and the subordination of the military to civilian authorities characterize this variable. In terms of the security to civilian leaders between 1960 and 1974, French troops still present provide security to civilian leaders, especially to the president. French troops are positioned within five miles of the presidential palace for the security of the president (McNamara 1989). Civil-military relations in this period show the control of the military by civilian authorities. Most of the military units are under direct French control or have French military advisers involved in their decision making process. Most military instructors are French non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers who are able to instill the right professional military education into the new national military.

Dependent Variable

Three different aspects characterize the dependent variable, military coup. First, there must be an effective irregular seizure of the executive central power. Second, the organized national military or security forces must perpetrate this irregular seizure. Third,

this must occur with the use of, or threat of use of force. From 1960 to 1974, Senegal

does not register any military coups or governmental instability. The first president is

elected democratically through a fairly transparent, popular and free electoral process

followed by the establishment of embryonic but stable governmental institutions. This is

the case in many other independent countries under the supervision of the still present

colonial powers. This is based on the provision of the Loi cadre which is a law passed on

23 June 1956 by the French National Assembly which provides for universal adult

suffrage for all African subjects in French colonies.

Case Analysis: Senegal 1974-2012

Control Variables

Political Development and Weak Institutions

The mass participation of citizens in the political life of the country grows

stronger with the effective creation of 35 political parties. However, President Senghor

does not allow those parties. He believes in one-party democracy, arguing that the

national institutions are not strong enough to handle many political parties at this point

(Gellar 2005). More strikes and political turmoil follow the 1968 student strike and many

political leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade, emerge with the forceful intent of taking part

in the political life of the country. President Senghor manages the situation with four

political parties. Senghor voluntarily retires and hands over power to his protégé, Abdou

Diouf, on 1 January 1981. He positions Abdou Diouf to succeed him through rapid

promotions and special appointments. Abdou Diouf continues with Senghor`s policies,

but he allows 14 opposition political parties to contest the 1983 elections, instead of the

four Senghor had allowed. This is a great improvement of the existing political

environment and the real beginning of democracy with popular sovereignty. This mass participation grows stronger and stronger creating more challenges to the institutions which do not always keep up with this furious pace.

The executive constraint in Senegal is very weak as the President has full control over the whole state's apparatus. The judiciary as well as the legislative is subservient to the good will of the executive branch and the ruling party, the Senegalese Socialist Party. There are about 72 political parties carrying the voice of the populace into some major parties which constitute a unique true multiparty, democratic political culture in Senegal. A flourishing independent media of all types constitutes a platform which enhances the political participation through free press and freedom of opinion. This media of all types broadens the spectrum of mass participation and contributes to spread the will of the population in the country. Elections are organized and this period sees three different presidents democratically elected in Senegal. Abdoulaye Wade serves two terms of five years each from 2000 to 2010, and Macky Saal is currently serving his first term. In spite of all the efforts and progress made, the judiciary branch remains relatively weak and cannot claim any real check on the executive authority. The June 2011 Polity IV project report, which identifies some substantial limitations in executive constraints in Senegal, shares this position.

Ethnic Plurality, Dominance and Antagonism

There is no significant change in this variable compared to the previous period from 1960 to 1974. Although the population grows bigger, the percentage of the various ethnic groups remains unchanged. The same dynamics observed with regards to ethnic

dominance and antagonism are still present and handled by the rural religious leaders

with the assistance of the still present colonial oversight.

Colonial Heritage

The colonial legacy from 1960 is in play in Senegal. The political system remains

the same as earlier with the three branches. The French language is still the official

language, and more and more French culture is introduced in the country. The retired

President Senghor becomes a member of the French Academy as the only African ever

accepted into this prestigious French intellectual circle. The maintenance of cultural

relations with France is a priority for Senghor and Diouf (Chafer 2013).

Military Centrality

Even though fully Africanized with fairly acceptable resources, the military's

centrality is still under civilian control. The Senegalese military remains in close ties with

the French military which is still in the country. Military expenditures are under the

control of the civilian authorities who decide on the needs of the military and how and

where to employ this organization. Military intervention in the country's life, is based

solely on request from the government and approved by the parliament with specific task.

Only recently, starting in 2007, the Senegalese electoral code allows the military to vote

in the presidential elections (Agency for French Development 2013).

Economic Challenges

In spite of some noticeable progress in economic growth, Senegal remains one of

the poorest countries in the world (155th of 187, according to the 2011 United Nations

Development Program's Human Development Index) (Chafer 2013). The country is one

of the priority recipients of French aid. As Senegal's largest bilateral aid donor, France

gives euro (EUR) 119 million in 2010, ahead of the World Bank (EUR 83 million), the

U.S. (EUR 77 million) and the European Union (EUR 63 million).Total French aid to

Senegal is EUR 152 million, of which about 80 percent is bilateral aid and 20 percent

multilateral (EUR 33 million). In 2010, Senegal is the world's 12th largest recipient of

French aid and the fourth largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Leaving aside debt cancellation,

French bilateral aid to Senegal is relatively stable since 2003, averaging some EUR 120

million annually. In 2010, French bilateral aid consists of 51 percent in grants (EUR 62

million, not counting debt cancellation and fees), 33 percent in fees (EUR 39 million), 8

percent of debt cancellation (EUR 9 million) and 8 percent loans (EUR 9 million) (Chafer

2013). The Senegalese economy cannot flourish without French involvement. The

strategic position and role played by the country in hosting French troops explains the

relatively important economic assistance from France.

Political Challenges with Insurgency

Looking at the political challenges with insurgency, Senegal experiences a

secession attempt from the southern part of the country (Casamance), which begins in the

1980s and extends until recent years when the Senegalese Government signs a peace

agreement with the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance). In his February

2012 article, "Casamance conflict is unhealed sore for Senegal," David Lewis says: "the

on-off low-intensity rebellion, now entering its fourth decade, has hardly registered in

campaigning even though it remains an unhealed blemish on Senegal's otherwise

enviable reputation as the only country in mainland West Africa that has not suffered a

coup or a civil war since independence" (Lewis 2012).

Independent Variable

Since 1960 France maintains its military installations in Senegal and even reinforces them in 1974 when their bases in Niger are closed by forced. The strength of French troops rises from 1,300 to 2,500 in this period with more military equipment. Senegal launches every French military operation in West Africa. Although the 1960s defense accords between Senegal and France are sometimes controversial, there is no doubt that they benefit Senegalese military capabilities in every domain (Diop 2013). Some Senegalese nationalists always question these accords arguing that they are in contradiction with the concept of independence. This is the position of the then Prime Minister Mamadou Dia who is accused of a coup attempt in 1962.

Relatively small French garrisons, strategically placed within easy striking distance from vital French interests including local leaders, preserve a visible French military presence (McNamara 1989). President Leopold Sedar Senghor maintains this presence, as does Abdou Diouf who succeeds him in 1981.

Intervening Variable

There is no change in the French strategy with regards to the protection of local civilian leaders with focus on the President. This security includes activation of the French intelligence antenna of Dakar established in the wake of independence which provides information on all kinds of threats. Forward–deployed troops are prepositioned to quickly smother local problems at an early stage before they can get out-of-hand (McNamara 1989). Professionalization of the Senegalese military continues under French control with creation of the Officers' academy of Thies and the Non-Commissioned Officers' academy of Kaolack. These two institutions fully commanded by French

officers and NCOs, are able to train and educate Senegalese military leaders who are then

gradually incorporated into the national military chain of command. The permanent

presence of the French military helps mentor the newly trained Senegalese officers and

NCOs to find their role and place as military inside the society. The Senegalese military

is therefore able to operate professionally under the control of civilian authorities based

on a sound civil-military relation. The French military presence is still obvious in Senegal

and the French Army in Senegal plays a tremendous role in the country's political

stability (Chafer 2013). Security observers and political analysts such as Professor

Thierno Bah of the University of Dakar consider the Senegalese military's collaborative

relationships with civilian authorities and the public as key reasons why Senegal never

experiences the civil wars and coup d'états that other West African countries suffered.

Dependent Variable: Military Coups and Governmental Instability

Senegal never has any successful military coups or any governmental instability.

The only significant event in that regard is the controversial coup attempt in 1962

(Marshall and Marshall 2012). After independence in 1960, Senegal enjoys one of the

most peaceful transitions from colonial rule in West Africa. Its first two elected

presidents each serve for 20 years, with peaceful transfers of power, followed by a fully

democratic election in 2000. President Senghor, through his close ties with the French

establishment, is able to design a political system based on the French model in every

aspect thus resulting in a stable politico-economic environment. "One of the most stable

and least repressive political regimes on the African continent, Senegal is spared the

ethnic and religious strife that tears apart other African nations and avoids the military

coups that elsewhere spelled the demise of civilian rule; Senegal owes much of its political stability to Leopold sedar Senghor" (Gellar 1982, 23).

Niger

Background

Niger is a former French colony located in West Africa which gains independence from France on 3 August 1960. Niger is a landlocked country with a total area of 1,267square kilometers and a population of 16 900,000 (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). The country borders Nigeria and Benin to the south, Burkina Faso and Mali to the west, Algeria and Libya to the north, and Chad to the east. The capital city is Niamey. Niger holds a strategic position of great importance to France by being the link between the French Northern African colonies and the Sub-Saharan colonies. This position is very important to the French troops during war in Algeria.

Figure 5.   Map of Niger

Source: MapZones, "Map of Niger," www.kids.mapzones.com (accessed 6 November 2013).

Case Analysis: Niger 1960-1974

Control Variables

Political Development and Weak Institutions

At independence, the great fever of nationalism pushes most Nigeriens to seek participation in the country's political life. More and more political entities from the

independence movement are pushing to have their say in regards to the political direction

of the country. This popular eagerness contrasts with the embryonic institutions of the

young country which are still in the process of settling down. The notion of political

parties is taking shape with the control of the colonial power still looming over the whole

newly independent country. The major political parties are: The Progressive Party of

Niger led by Diori Hamani, and the Union of Popular Forces for Democracy and

Progress-Sawaba led by Bakary Djibo (Mwakikagile 2001, 126). There is a great sense of

political participation among the population of the young country with nascent

institutions which are not mature enough to handle this flow of mass participation.

Ethnic Plurality, Dominance and Antagonism

The population of Niger is very diverse with more than 10 different ethnic groups.

The dominant ethnic group is Hausa with 56 percent, followed by the Djerma (21

percent), Touaregs (10 percent), Peuls (9 percent) and many other small ethnic groups

such as Songhai, Arab-Berber, and Kanuri. Niger is 90 percent Muslim and 20 percent

Christian and other indigenous religions. The dominant ethnic group is the Haussa, but

antagonism involves all major ethnic groups. Ethnic tension at some point within Niger

assumes special significance in 1968 because of the civil war going on in neighboring

Nigeria. The country's main political problems through the years result from the internal

antagonism between Arab-Berber nomads and black farmers, and between Djerma-

Songhai and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups (Mwakikagile 2001, 125). The Touareg in the

north felt they were treated unequally when compared to the other ethnic groups. They

expressed their discontentment, but the government did not pay any attention to their

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concerns. The severe drought of 1968 exacerbates this feeling and pushes most Touaregs into neighboring Algeria and Libya where many receive military training.

Colonial Heritage

The political system is a French heritage with three branches: executive, legislative and judicial branches; all of which are embryonic at this point. The official language is French, inherited from the colonial power. Another important colonial heritage is the military structure based on the French model including the gendarmerie, an equivalent of military police, as a component of the defense forces tasked with the law enforcement issues. In spite of the predominance of the Islamic culture there are still some visible vestiges of French culture in the country. The French system is the basis for the educational system. Some Nigerien students attend the French University of Dakar in Senegal. The colonial heritage is visible in almost every domain of the country's life.

Military Centrality

Between 1960 and 1974, the Nigerien military is still under the command of French military leaders with mostly French resources. The Nigerien military, created from three companies of French colonial forces, is placed under civilian control. Nigerien soldiers are officered by the French military who could take joint French-Nigerien citizenship. French leadership in the Nigerien military influences the military centrality. French officers are permanently present and assigned to provide the appropriate military professional education to the nascent local army. The military expenditure of Niger in this period is about $2,000 per soldier per year (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

Economic Challenge

Between 1960 and 1974, Niger's economic situation is as poor as the situation in other newly independent West African countries. Mwakikagile describes Niger's economic situation as "chronic poverty" and goes on to assert that Niger should not be an independent country in the first place because of its hopeless economic situation. The average GDP per capita in this period is $476. The country does not have any known natural resources and the desert climate does not allow for much agricultural activities. The severe drought which occurs in 1968 makes this situation worse.

Political Challenge with Insurgency

In 1960 just after independence, Diori Hamani becomes the first president who bans all political parties, thus instituting a one-party state which becomes a continental phenomenon. The major political challenge at this point is, on one hand, the internal lack of democracy, and on the other hand, President Diori's opposing views of the French support to the Biafra rebels in Nigeria. In spite of all these challenges, there is no armed insurgency with secessionist intent in Niger during this period.

Independent Variable: Foreign Permanent Military Establishment

As defined, this variable requires the presence of thousands troops from a military power of a democratic state. As already mentioned in this research, France is in this category. Just after independence, France maintains a visible military establishment in Niger. There are French military bases in Niamey, Zinder, Bilaro and Agadez with a total of 1,500 personnel in the 4th Oversea Regiment. In 1965, President Diori Hamani signs legislation to end the employment of French military in Niger, but some continue to serve

until forced to leave the country when the law is fully implemented in 1974 (Decalo 1979, 33-35). Due to their limited academic and military professional education, the indigenous Nigerien military cannot become officers. They are limited to NCO ranks serving under French officers. The French military presence is visible at every level of the national military chain of command. This situation seems to be the continuation of colonization in contradiction of the independence that the country just gained. This situation results in more and more pressure from the military to claim its autonomy.

Intervening Variable

Like in many other independent French West African countries, French troops still present in Niger provide security to Niger's established authorities. These French troops make sure President Diori and his leading team get the necessary security and control over the military in the country. The new national army is still under the leadership of French officers and NCOs who are providing the required training and education necessary to develop and improve the professionalism of the local military personnel. This French military presence, along with training and education programs maintains the new Nigerien army in its right place under the civilian oversight. The continuous French military presence means security for the national leaders and good civil-military relation in Niger.

Dependent Variable: Military Coup and Governmental Instability

From 1960 through 1973, Niger does not experience any military coups or any governmental instability. Diori Hamani is the President of the newly independent state during this period with the above- mentioned characteristics. French garrisons spread

throughout the country, but the military is still run by French officers who know the right place of the military under civilian control. Under French leadership, there is no ethnic cleavage in the military because French officers do not have any ethnic bias. This continuous French control of the Nigerien national forces does not please some of the indigenous soldiers who see it as a continuation of the colonization. In spite of all this, there is no military coup as defined in this study, and President Diori Hamani remains in power during this period.

<u>Case Analysis: Niger 1974-2012</u>

Control Variables

<u>Political Development and Weak Institutions</u>

The institutions are still weak and face mass political participation translated by an increase in the number of political parties. This strong will of political participation war undermines by the autocratic system installed beginning in 1974. There is a long period of military rule with the associated institutions which does not match the political development and mass participation in the country. Following the last military coup in 2010, the new democratic institutions are established in 2011. The most prominent political parties and their leaders include: Democratic and Social Convention-Rahama (Mahamane OUSMANE); National Movement for a Developing Society-Nassara; Niger Social Democratic Party; Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Social Progress-Zaman Lahiya (Moumouni DJERMAKOYE); Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation; Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (Mahamadou ISSOUFOU); Rally for Democracy and Progress-Jama'a (Hamid ALGABID); Social and Democratic Rally (Cheiffou AMADOU); Union for Democracy and the Republic-Tabbat; Union of

Independent Nigeriens (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). The democratic wind that blows over the whole African continent in the 1990s facilitates this great emergence of political parties. The whole population craves to participate in the country's politics but there are no substantial institutions or mechanism to enable this mass participation. The transition to multiparty competitive election is apparent, but other features of democracy such as the establishment of state institutions and structures that respect social and political rights, instill transparency and accountability are still missing.

Ethnic Plurality, Dominance and Antagonism

The population grows with the same diverse ethnic groups, led by the Hausa as the dominant group. The ethnic antagonism grows stronger and ethnic related tension is palpable in the country. The internal ethnic antagonism between Arab-Berber nomads and black farmers, between Djerma-Songhai and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups is still of concern (Mwakikagile 2001, 125). With the military rule in place, lack of consideration of the Touareg claim of unequal treatment triggers the Touareg rebel movement in the country. Most Touaregs who emigrated in the early 1970s return in the 1980s with their government promising them resettlement assistance, but in Niger the assistance never materializes. This and other grievances constitute the stage setter for the Touareg armed rebellion later.

Colonial Heritage

The French model inherited from the colonial time is the basis for the overall administration system, but the military rule is not in line with the French structure. The official language remained French and culturally, things were done the French way.

Although the military is nationalized, the French system, uniforms, and some equipment left behind by French troops is the basis for its structure and organization. The French presence is noticeable in private businesses and cultural and economic domains. The currency is the French West Africa Franc, common to all former French West African colonies. The French ties are still there but they cannot influence the military which gains more and more power in the country.

Military Centrality

Beginning in 1974, the military became very influential and dictated its will in the country. The military expenditures rise from U.S. $476 to an average of U.S. $5,500 per soldier per year (Correlates of War Project 2013). The military becomes resourceful and more cohesive with a great deal of esprit de corps. Even though the government, established by the new regime in 1974, includes civilians in the cabinet, the military is in strong control of the country. The new constitution in place in the last decade stipulates that parliament must approve military expenditures and actions, but this procedure is not been fully implemented yet.

Economic Challenge

The economy gets off to a desperate start as the country recovers from the bad drought that destroys the whole country from 1968 through 1973. Fourteen percent of Niger's GDP is generated by livestock production (camels, goats, sheep and cattle), which supports 35 percent of the population. At the beginning of this period, the country's economy flourishes due to uranium production, but when uranium prices fall in the 1980s, its brief period of prosperity ends. In spite of the big progress registered over

time, a 2013 United Nations Development Program report ranks Niger among the poorest countries of the world (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). According to the latest Polity IV report, Niger's GDP per capita is $247. Niger experiences many droughts with the worst one in 2005 when four million citizens suffer from malnutrition (United Nations Development Program 2005). There is a noticeable increase in economic challenges for Niger when compared to the previous period considered in this study.

Political Challenge with Insurgency

The claim of unequal treatment raised by Touareg in the late 1960s evolves and creates turmoil in the country. Upon promise from the Nigerien government to take care of their claims and concern, most Touaregs return after a decade of staying in Libya and Algeria where most men receive military training. As the government fails to respect its promises, the armed rebellion group called the Nigerien Movement for Justice comes into existence and starts fighting the Nigerien military in 1991. The Nigerien military fights the Touareg rebellion until 1998 when a peace accord is signed promising administrative decentralization, improved development in the north, and disarmament and integration of former fighters into the national army. Claiming that the government does not respect the clauses of the peace accord, the Touareg rebel movement resumes its attacks in 2003 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 2013). The Nigerien government and major international organizations are still working hand in hand to find a political solution to the situation.

Independent Variable

The independent variable of concern in this study is the permanent presence of military troops from a democratic developed state. This condition is met during the first

period between 1960 and 1974. Starting in 1974 with the signing of the legislation by President Diori Hamani demanding the evacuation of French military from Niger, the former colonial power closes its military installations throughout the country. The last French troops leave Niger in the wake of 1974 and as result, the 4th French Oversea Regiment is dismantled (Decalo 1979). There are two major reasons for this decision. First, the indigenous military personnel do not want to continue serving in their units under French leadership and want full autonomy. The second reason is President Diori's opposition to French support of the rebels in the Biafra war in neighboring Nigeria (Mwakikagile 2001). Indigenous Nigeriens quickly fill the vacancy created by the departure of French officers. Most of them become officers without the required training and education related to the positions they held. The necessary leadership skills are missing at many levels of the military chain of command which operate without the French guidance. The professionalization process stops and the civil leaders are at the mercy of the military without the protection that enjoyed from French troops.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable under consideration in this study is a military coup which is the successful seizure of the executive power by the organized military or security forces with the use, or threat of use of force. On 15 April 1974, Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche, Chief of the Staff of Niger's small 2,500-man army, uses the Nigerien national army and overthrows President Diori Hamani by force (Mwakikagile 2001, 128). As Mwakikagile notes, there is an accusation of governmental corruption and mishandling of the drought situation against President Diori. This successful military coup is the first of a series of violent regime changes in Niger. He then rules the country militarily until his

death in 1987. Colonel Ali Saibou, confirmed in a mockery of an election in 1989, replaces Diori. The democratic wind that sweeps across West Africa in the 1990s forces Colonel Saibou to turn power over to a transitional government led by Andre Salifou who organizes democratic elections in 1993. Mahaman Ousmane, elected President, quickly finds himself in conflict with his Prime Minister resulting in the paralysis of the political system by 1995. The Prime Minister demotes top civil officials without the consent of the President who then refuses to promulgate the budget of 1996. This situation leads to the second military coup in January 1996 perpetrated by Colonel Ibrahim Bare Mainassara using the national military to seize power by force.

President Mainassara is corrupt and inefficient, and is assassinated in a military coup orchestrated by his own guard led by Colonel Malam Wanke in April 1999. Colonel Wanke promises to turn the power over to civilian control and keeps his promise by organizing competitive elections concluding in November 1999 in the victory of Mamadou Tandja, a retired army Colonel.

Although democratically elected, Tandja's rule is less democratic. The Polity IV report of 2010 categorizes the country as autocratic. Tandja reaches the pinnacle of his autocratic regime in 2010 when he tries to modify the constitution in order to run for a third term. He has already served his two terms of five years each as stipulated in the Nigerien constitution adopted in December 1992. He dismantles the parliament which is reluctant to comply with his will and replaces it with a new one in his favor. This whole confusion and resentment in the population leads to Niger's fourth military coup led by Major Salou Djibo in February 2010. Major Djibo leads a transition period until 2011 and organizes a democratic competitive election won by Mahamadou Issifou who is the

current Nigerien President. From 1974 through 2012, Niger experiences four military

coup d'états: 1974, 1996, 1999 and 2010 (Marshall and Marshall, 2012).

Table 4.   Comparison of Outcomes between Niger and Senegal

VARIABLES	SENEGAL		NIGER	
	1960-1974	1974-2012	1960-1974	1974-2012
CONTROL VARIABLES	PRESENT	PRESENT	PRESENT	PRESENT
FOREIGN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (IV)	PRESENT	PRESENT	PRESENT	ABSENT
INTERVENING VARIABLE	PRESENT	PRESENT	PRESENT	ABSENT
OUTCOME (DV)	NO MILITARY COUP	NO MILITARY COUP	NO MILITARY COUP	4 MILITARY COUPS

Source: Created by author.

Analysis

This second section of the chapter analyzes and interprets the findings and

characteristics of the two countries in this case study. It looks at similarities and

differences and highlights their significance to the current research.

Niger and Senegal are two West African countries colonized by France which

grants them independence in the 1960s. Considering the first era (1960-1974), the author

noticed that the populations of the two countries are diverse and multi-ethnic with antagonistic overtones. The dominance of one ethnic group in each country marks this ethnic plurality, the Hausa in Niger and the Wolof in Senegal. The ethnic dominance and antagonism do not lead to military coup or any sort of violent government change in either country. Just after their independence, the two countries start off with a great sense of mass participation in the political process with national pride in spite of the embryonic status of their respective institutions. Their colonial legacy leaves them with the same type of governmental structure: executive, legislative and judicial branches. This political development, along with the mass participation of citizen in the two countries, unfolds without governmental instability or military coups. The new armies of the two countries are still under French military leadership. French troops are present in Niger as well as in Senegal providing military education and training and protecting the newly established national institutions. This military presence prevents the military of these two countries from intervening in their respective countries' political life. They are under the control of civilian authorities. Elections are organized in each country under the oversight of the former colonial power which still has political influence. The research reveals that, in spite of the presence of all the factors that must lead to military coups and governmental instability as per table 3, this era from 1960 through 1973 is coup free and rather stable. Neither country registers any military coup d'état between 1960 and 1974 (Marshall and Marshall 2012). In the quest for a better understanding of this state of affairs, this study looks at the second era from 1974 through 2012.

In this second period under consideration, the research reveals that are no significant changes in the control variables within the two countries. These variables are

all increasingly present in both countries. Economically, Niger and Senegal are still among the poorest of the world. This period sees the occurrence of some political challenges with the rise of rebel groups with secessionist intent in both countries; the Touareg in Niger in the 1980s and the Casamance rebels in Senegal. This last occurrence in the two countries is not relevant to the advent of military coup or governmental instability because the first military coup happens in Niger in 1974 long before the eruption of the Touareg rebellion. Furthermore, Senegal experiences the same kind of event, but is coup free to the present.

Oddly enough, the first military coup occurs in Niger just after the evacuation from the country of the last French troops, along with the closure of French military installations. France is now a democratic state where the military is strictly under civilian authority. No matter how disastrous the civil governing officials are in France, there are no substantiated military coups in the modern era. The concept of civil-military relations instilled into the military of Niger and Senegal through the presence of French troops in the two countries encapsulate this code of conduct and principles. The education of Senegalese and Nigerian militaries in civil-military relations is at its infancy stage when the President of Niger decides to terminate French military presence in his country in 1974, while Senegal reinforces it.

By demanding the evacuation of the French military from Niger, President Diori Hamani breaks the momentum of the young Nigerien military organization which is benefiting from French military presence. Just after independence, most West African militaries consider themselves as superior to the civilians regardless of their political or administrative position. This mindset derives from the fact that the colonial powers use

the military to impose their will upon their respective colonies beginning with the colonization. The new armed forces, which dominate the whole country in the absence of the colonial power, pick up this trend. The presence of French military installations in Senegal helps inculcate a sustainable concept of civil-military relations in the country's military thus preventing military coups and governmental instability. The creation of the Officers' academy and the NCOs academy in Senegal is the fruit of the permanent French military presence in the country.

The Nigerien military also benefits from the same presence of the French military which is in the process of shaping it in terms of military education and training as well as the civil military relations. This may explain why the country does not register any military coups during the French military presence from 1960 to 1974 until the last French troops leave Niger. Just after the departure of the bulk of the French troops, the Nigerien armed forces fall back into the prevailing trend in West Africa where the military has control (and still has in most of them) over civilian authorities. The Nigerien armed forces then start questioning the governing ability of civilian leaders who no longer have the protection of French troops. Eventually, a military coup d'état is conducted on 15 April 1974 led by the then Chief of the Army. If the French maintain their military presence, this military coup might not happen in Niger. There are accusations against President Hamani of mismanagement of the severe drought that hits the country between 1968 and 1973 and also the inability to stop the alleged government corruption and lead the country (Mwakikagile 2001). The drought occurs while the French are still present in Niger. Why does the military not react and conduct a coup at that time? The drought situation begins in late 1968 and the government corruption is not

an overnight issue. In 1996, the perpetrator of the military coup justifies his act with the ongoing political deadlock. This same situation occurs in many developed countries but never results in military coups. There are government shutdowns in great powers without any military involvement whatsoever.

The recurrent issue of military coups is rooted in the perception of the overseer and engraved in the West African militaries. As noticed, the pattern in Niger is the cyclic accusation of inefficiency or corruption of the leading power. This study legitimately ponders how long the current democratically elected president will last before the next military coup. The deepest root resides in how the military in West African countries is created, educated and ultimately how it is mentored by the colonial powers before and just after independence. A military coup d'état as defined in this study, is conducted by the regular armed forces of a given country. The armed forces of small countries are therefore the primary institution that needs care, specifically in its interaction with the civilian authorities. The military in Niger could use more mentorship from the French military in order to gain a sustainable training and education in regards to the role and place of the military in a country. Like in most of the West African countries, the "solo flight" of the Nigerien military is too sudden thus creating a very fertile environment for governmental instability and military coups. National armies hastily patched together on the eve of independence have no training structures capable of supplying the sudden need for a large body of officers. Old soldiers receive an accelerated, mostly basic training course designed just to raise their levels of general education before hasty commissioning (McNamara 1989).

The Senegalese military on the other hand, continuously benefits from the French

military expertise in civil-military relations and can adapt it to whichever situation occurs

in the country. The military leadership, in full and trustworthy collaboration with the civil

authorities, handles all the factors that may lead to military coups. The country goes far

beyond the simple concept of civil-military relation by creating a new concept called the

"concept of Armée-Nation which is the Senegalese model of civil-military collaboration

that promotes development and security. France maintains its military installations and

troops in Senegal mainly to protect its interests and resident citizens. Crowder argues that

in Senegal, 10 percent of the national income upon independence comes from the

presence of French troops. French presence provides not only security, but also

contributes to the economy of Senegal. One of the largest French military presences is in

Senegal. The degree of French economic interests in the country, the number of French

residents and the type of political links determines the size. It is clear that an irresistible

love for Senegal is not the basis of this French military presence. The basis is the

protection of French interests in Senegal and throughout the West African region. As

McNamara notes in his book, *France in Black Africa*, "Political independence and the

accompanying need to establish national armies forced the French to reevaluate their

military strategy in sub-Saharan Africa; They soon concluded that a continuing French

military presence would be needed to support the newborn local security forces, to assure

stability in the region, and to protect French citizen and their residual interests"

(McNamara 1989, 146). Unlike Senegal, many other independent West African countries

cannot benefit from the stability provided by the French military presence with troops

and equipment on the ground. The following table shows the French presence with troops

and advisers in some Francophone West African countries and the registered number of
military coups.

Table 5.   Comparative Table of French Military Presence
in Niger and Senegal

Country	Strength of French troops.	Number of French military advisers	Number of military coups in the country
Niger	00	60	04
Senegal	1250	34	00

Source: T. Francis McNamara, *France in Black Africa* (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, 1989), 24

This table shows that only Senegal which still has French troops on its soil
remains coup free. The presence of military advisers is not enough to deter military coups
in the various countries. In keeping with the comparison conducted by this study, Niger
has more French military advisers than Senegal and registers four military coups. The
establishment of foreign military installations is a determining factor in the military coup
and governmental instability. In the case of Senegal, small French garrisons are
conspicuous throughout the country to show a visible French presence. They are "said to
be under standing orders to have a platoon of fully armed troops at the presidential
palace, five mile from their camp, within 30 minutes of an order from the local French
ambassador; one assumes that units in Dakar have similarly precise instructions to move
smartly to protect friendly chiefs of state" (McNamara 1989, 147).

Protecting French is not the only reason for these military installations. They also help provide stability and assure the civilian control of the national military in the given country. This study strongly agrees with McNamara who argues that it is certainly more than a coincidence that Senegal in West Africa happens to be the only former French dependency continuously governed by civilian chiefs of state; the implicit guarantees furnished by permanent French military presence surely contribute to the longevity of their rule. This contribution translates through not only the readiness of the French troops to intervene, but also through the established efficient intelligence network. The African section of France's external intelligence services, the *Service de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre Espionage* is established in Dakar on the eve of independence by Colonel Maurice Robert (McNamara 1989, 176).

<u>Summary</u>

Chapter 4 reviews the characteristics of Niger and Senegal with focus on the controlled comparison of the different variables in order to gain a deeper understanding of the causes of military coups and governmental instability in West Africa. The study highlights the similarities and differences between these two countries and their influence on the advent of military coups. Senegal which maintains the French military presence throughout the year after its independence never registers any military coups and still enjoys a governmental stability in spite of the presence of all other vectors of military coups. The first military coup occurs in Niger just after the complete evacuation of the French military from the country in 1974. This study concludes that the permanent French military establishment in Senegal plays a major role in its governmental stability through their positive impact on the country's civil-military relations and the security

provided to civilian leaders. The deepest root of military coups and governmental

instability in West Africa resides in the rash abandonment of the West African militaries

by the major great powers.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The primary focus of this research is to widen the understanding of the causes of military coups and governmental instability in West Africa. West Africa registers military coups at an alarming rate, more than any other region on the continent. The post-independence era sees less stability due to a vicious circle of violence ranging from civil unrest to military takeover, and more often than not, degeneration into civil war like in the case of Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire. Military coups and violent regime changes until now explained by factors other than the overarching immaturity demonstrated by the majority of West African militaries. If the decolonization and independence movements are still proud achievements, the autonomy of the militaries of these small countries is premature and rash. These embryonic military organizations are not prepared to deal with the complex concept of civil-military relations and therefore should be on a leash longer after independence. This is achieved through the continuous presence of the colonial military establishment after independence as highlighted by the case study in this research.

The foundation of military organizations in regards to their position vis-a-vis the civilian authority is not well established in West African countries. It is therefore vital that they stay under the mentorship of their respective colonial military power or any other major power for the sake of stability. In one of its reports titled "*Senegal's Armée-Nation,*" Partners for Democratic Change, an African Institute for security sector transformation based in Washington, DC, states that "In West African States the relations between civilians and the security sector is a crucial social dynamic and the lack of

effective civilian oversight and control over the sector is one of the primary causes of instability in the region. Thus, security sector reform that envisions improved civil-military relations is an essential first step toward a stable West Africa" (The World Bank 2009). Senegal is able to achieve this objective with the close assistance of the French military establishment still available in the country even after independence. This explains why shortly after Senegal's independence, the first President of Senegal, Leopold Sédar Senghor, and his military's Chief of Defense Staff, General Jean Alfred Diallo, are able to determine that the military should play a major role in the country's development as well as serve the Senegalese people under the unequivocal leadership of civilian authorities.

As stated, the main focus of this research is to provide a deeper understanding of the causes of military coup d'états and governmental instability in West Africa. Political development, ethnic plurality, ethnic antagonism, economic shortfalls, bad governance, and military centrality are all challenges addressed without resorting to military coup. This study acknowledges the existence of these factors and their importance, but it is definitely the military that decides whether or not to perpetrate a military coup. Pervasive and persistently desperate levels of economic growth along with high levels of poverty are sources of the social discontentment that may precipitate governmental instability and military coups. It is also true that the quest for geo-strategic influence and regional security by foreign powers in the past results in shadow participation in inter- and intrastate conflicts and in support to West African dictators, thereby fueling the flame of violent dissent (Ben Barka and Ncube 2012, 6). The current study argues that without the participation of the military itself these factors do not translate into military coups. The

foreign military presence, which not only deters military coups but also fosters a sustainable civil-military relation, mostly softens the dissidence and resentment created by the support to dictators. There is discontentment in Senegal especially with the famous student strike of 1968, but this does not lead to military coup. The regime is not always a consolidated democracy but the military knows its place in the whole system and remains neutral under the authority of civilian leaders. The key factor is the military itself which still needs more involvement from major military powers of the world in order to embody the constitutional way of solving national challenges regardless of their harshness. In order to thrive in their inceptions, the newborn national armies in the independent West African countries could use the permanent visible military presence of great powers to establish the fundamentals of stable governmental institutions. West African defense and security forces must resolutely limit themselves in fulfilling the role assigned to them by their nation in accordance with constitutional rules and republican ethos. Most militaries in the region do not reach the required military professional education level before the premature departure of the colonial troops.

The regional institution, ECOWAS is not able to mitigate governmental instability and military coups in West Africa because its initial objective specifically focuses on economic integration and does not address political and stability issues. Most of the founding members come to power through military coup and therefore cannot openly address that issue. The late 1990s see a change in that position and some amendments to the ECOWAS charter condemn military coups and violent government changes in West Africa. However, the last military coups in Guinea Bissau, Niger, and Mali show that there is more to do than just simple condemnation. The Organization of

African Union, which became the African Union, is not able to solve the problem of military coups in general in Africa for the same reason as ECOWAS. The research is resolutely convinced that permanent foreign military presence established by a democratic power helps reshape the mentality of West African militaries thereby lowering the likelihood of governmental instability and military coups in the region. This is the ideal which is obviously hard to achieve based on the current framework of international relations throughout the world.

Even though this research specifically focuses on West Africa, a quick glance at other African regions seems to confirm the understanding provided by this study. This is the case of Gabon in Central Africa and Djibouti in Eastern Africa which have not registered any military coup d'état since their independence (Marshall and Marshall 2012). These two countries just like Senegal, maintain French military establishment on their soil after independence. This state of affairs might be either coincidental or fully in line with the position in this paper. For more insight, this research recommends further studies in these two parts of Africa with focus on Gabon in Central Africa and Djibouti in Eastern Africa. Furthermore, the author recommends that other research focus on the necessary approach to adopt in order to leverage the identified deficiency in the West African militaries without infringing the sacred notion of sovereignty of those countries. The pending regional alignment program initiated by the U.S. seems to be the right approach to the problem of governmental instability and military coups in the whole African continent; however this research recommends thorough studies before its implementation.

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